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Immigration is currently high up
the political agenda in most
European countries as they
struggle to deal with the
increased flow of migrants that
many have experienced in recent years.
Many countries have a sizeable fraction of
the population who are hostile to
immigration, especially to immigrants from
poorer countries or those of a different
ethnicity to the majority.
In this climate, it is critically important
to understand more about how immigrants
fare – and not just the first-generation
immigrants but their children too. After all,
the longer-run effects of immigration are
probably much more influenced by how
the descendants of immigrants fare than
the immigrants themselves.
In a recent study, we compare the
experiences of first- and second-generation
immigrants in France, Germany and the UK
in terms of their education, earnings and
employment. These countries all
experienced large-scale immigration in the
1950s and 1960s so that enough time has
elapsed to be able to evaluate how the
immigrants’ children are getting on.
Although these countries have all had
sizeable immigrant populations for a
considerable time, they also differ in
important ways. First, the ethnic
composition of immigrant inflows is
different: immigrants in France and the UK
came from former colonies of those
countries, while Germany employed
immigrants from southern Europe and
Turkey.
Second, these countries have adopted
very different policies towards the
integration of immigrants. Put very crudely,
the UK has sought to accommodate and
celebrate cultural and ethnic diversity,
while France has sought to deny its
existence (at least in the public sphere) in
the interest of ‘equal treatment’. The
proposed banning of the burqa is a good
example of the latter approach.
In contrast with both these countries,
which typically granted immigrants full
citizenship, Germany did not, until
relatively recently, give citizenship to
immigrants or their children who were not
ethnically German. Long after it was clear
that they had come to stay, Germany
thought of its immigrants as only
temporary residents. 
Other European countries with more
recent immigration are considering which,
if any, of these models would be the best
one to adopt to facilitate the integration of
immigrants and their children. So it is
important to know how immigrants have
fared in France, Germany and the UK.
The central finding of our research is
that in all three countries, the labour
market performance of most immigrant
groups as well as their descendants is, on
average, worse than that of the native
population (after controlling for education,
potential experience and regional
allocation). 
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Are second-generation immigrants more
integrated into European societies than their
parents? Alan Manning and colleagues look at
evidence on economic integration for France,
Germany and the UK.
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But our study also finds
that the gap in educational
attainment between natives
and immigrants is much reduced in the
second generation compared with the first
generation. While there is considerable
heterogeneity across immigrant groups and
the children of immigrants still do worse
than the children of native-born parents,
they often do better than their own parents.
This suggests perhaps that education
systems are working to integrate the
children of immigrants though it is much
harder to say whether progress is as fast as
it could be.
Evidence of progress in labour market
performance is not the same for all
countries and all immigrant groups. For
immigrants’ net earnings, the UK stands out
as having particularly large differences for
the first generation but also much improved
outcomes for the second generation. 
In France and Germany, differences are
not so clear-cut. The difference in male
employment rates between immigrants and
natives in Germany and the UK seem similar
for first- and second-generation immigrants,
but France has a number of groups in which
the second-generation immigrants seem to
be doing worse than the first. For women,
the patterns are similar but there is clearer
general evidence of a reduction in
employment gaps for the second
generation, especially for those immigrant
groups where female employment rates are
very low in the first generation. 
In all countries, there is considerable
heterogeneity in outcomes across immigrant
groups, and any sensible account of
immigrant disadvantage must pay attention
to the fact that immigrants cannot be
treated as an undifferentiated lump.
Does the French, German or British
model of attitudes to immigrants appear
more favoured by these findings? The
answer is that no simple link appears.
France, which until recently has been
accused of sticking its head in the sand
over the existence of poor outcomes for
immigrant groups, does not seem to have
worse outcomes than the UK, which has
had anti-discrimination legislation for over
40 years. The UK, often accused now of
paying insufficient attention to the
assimilation of immigrants, has, if
anything, the largest improvement from
the first to the second generation. 
One possible explanation for our
inability to paint a simple picture is that
government policy is much less important
than many people think. In day-to-day life
and economic activity, it is the behaviour
and aspirations of immigrants and their
children – and how they are treated by
those with whom they interact – that is
important in determining economic
outcomes.
By a stroke of a pen, governments
may be able to pass anti-discrimination
legislation or prevent Muslim schoolgirls
wearing the hijab. But it is much harder to
change attitudes – and it is these attitudes
that ultimately determine outcomes. 
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